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EXPERIENCE OF GOD AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
CREDULITY: A REPLY TO ROWE 
Peter Losin 
The Principle of Credulity-i.e. that if I have an experience apparently of X then in the 
absence of good reasons to think the experience non-veridical I have evidence that X 
exists-is an essential premise in many formulations of the argument from religious 
experience. I defend this use of the principle against objections offered by William Rowe. 
I argue that experiences of God are checkable. and in ways (epistemically) significantly 
similar to the ways sensory experiences are checkable. and that treating sensory experiences 
as Rowe suggests we treat experiences of God demands wholesale scepticism with regard 
to the senses. 
Recently William Rowe' has argued that some otherwise plausible versions of 
the argument from religious experience--e.g. those of C. D. Broad2 and Richard 
Swinburne3-fail because an essential premise of those versions of the argument 
is false. The premise Rowe doubts has been called (by Swinburne) "The Principle 
of Credulity," and Rowe casts it as 
(a) When subjects have an experience they take to be of x, it is rational 
to conclude that they really do experience x unless we have positive 
reasons to think their experience delusive. (91) 
(a), Rowe argues, is not quite right; and when it is properly recast (as I shall 
do shortly) it turns out that its substitute no longer provides the arguer from 
religious experience with the support she needs. In what follows I shall examine 
and reject Rowe's arguments for these claims. I shall do so by (i) calling attention 
to some features of Rowe's treatment of the epistemology of experience of God, 
(ii) arguing that these features are, for reasons to be offered, unacceptable, and 
(iii) concluding that Rowe has not provided good reasons for rejecting arguments 
from religious experience which employ the Principle of Credulity. 
The role of (a) in the argument from religious experience is this. First, it is 
undoubtedly true that 
(b) experiences occur which seem to their subjects to be of God. 
This claim, along with (a) and the further claim that 
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(c) there are no good reasons for thinking that all or most experiences 
which seem to their subjects to be of God are delusive (i.e. non-veridical, 
where S's experience E Of object 0 is veridical if and only if (i) 0 
exists, (ii) S is (in E) aware of 0, and (iii) 0 is part of the cause of E), 
entails 
(d) it is rational to believe that at least some experiences which seem 
to their subjects to be of God really are experiences of God. 
And if (d) is true, then so is 
(e) it is rational to believe that God exists. (87) 
Rowe is prepared to grant the truth of (b). He concedes that we do not at 
present have good independent grounds for thinking that God does not exist, 
that He is not present in at least some religious experiences, or that He is not 
part of the cause of at least some religious experiences. Nor do we have hood 
grounds for thinking that all experiences of God occur under conditions which 
are likely to result in delusory experiences (88-89). His complaint is with (a), 
which he thinks should be recast as 
(a') When subjects have an experience which they take to be of x, and 
we know how to discover positive reasons for thinking their experiences 
delusive, if such reasons do exist, then it is rational to conclude that 
they really do experience x unless we have some positive reason to 
think their experiences are delusive. (91) 
The underlined clause, Rowe argues, expresses a qualification omitted by Broad 
and Swinburne, one which is not met by experience of God. Hence, while (a') 
does express an important "basic principle of rationality," it does not apply to 
experiences of God. So the argument fails. 
It is worth asking what we gain by replacing (a) with (a'). The former, after 
all, is simply the claim that (intentional or outer-directed, not necessarily sensory) 
experience should be treated as epistemically "innocent until proved guilty"; that 
unless it can be shown that an experience of X is not veridical we ought to 
suppose that it is-and so that X exists. There are, I suppose, two kinds of 
reasons why we might be unable to show that a particular experience was not 
veridical. Obviously if the experience is veridical we will be unable to show 
that it is not. On the other hand, we might just have no idea how to go about 
showing that the experience in question, or the kind of experience of which it 
is an instance, is non-veridical. In this case the experience might well be non-ver-
idical, even though no one could find this out or show it to be true. This kind 
of epistemic predicament is logically possible. And the rationale behind replacing 
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(a) with (a') is that any kind of experience which lands us in a predicament like 
this is uncheckable and so epistemically worthless. If experience of X is to 
provide good evidence for the claim that X exists it must be possible to tell that 
particular experiences of X are non-veridical if they are non-veridical. 
All this seems, with some qualifications, true enough. But why think that 
experience of God lands us in a predicament like this? Rowe suggests that there 
is a problem 
concern[ing] the finding of positive reasons for rejecting a particular 
experience or type of experience as probably delusive .... Since we 
don't know what circumstances make for delusive religious experiences, 
and we don't know what the conditions are in which, if satisfied, one 
would have the experience of God if there is a God to be experienced, 
we cannot really go about the process of determining whether there are 
or are not positive reasons for thinking religious experiences delusive 
(91 ). 
Rowe seems to have the following argument in mind here: 
and 
(0 It is not possible to specify conditions such that, were they satisfied, 
a subject would have a delusory (non-veridical) experience of God 
(g) it is not possible to specify conditions such that, were they satisfied, 
a subject would have a veridical experience of God; 
hence 
(h) it is not possible to know or have good reason to believe that 
particular experiences of God are veridical or non-veridical, or that 
experience of God qua kind of experience is veridical or non-veridical. 
Now (0 and (g) must be carefully qualified ifthey are to avoid obvious falsehood. 4 
Rowe offers in support of (0 and (g) the claims that "we don't know what bodily 
and mental conditions are likely to lead to delusory experiences of God ... [nor] 
do we know what the conditions are such that if we satisfy them we will have 
an experience of God" (90, emphasis added). In other words, the sorts of con-
ditions with which (0 and (g) are concerned include, but are probably not 
exhausted by, the bodily/mental/environmental condition of the subject, including 
her attitudes, beliefs and behavior. 
I shall return to (0 shortly. It is worth pointing out that many theists would 
concede the truth of (g), at least if what is called for is a set of such conditions 
which is (causally or logically) sufficient for the occurrence of a veridical experi-
ence of God. (Some have even argued that any experience of God for which 
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such a set of conditions can or could be specified cannot, for that reason alone, 
be a veridical experience of God. I believe this is mistaken, but that it is no part 
of my argument. 
Suppose it is true that we know of no set of conditions that is in the relevant 
sense sufficient for the occurrence of a veridical experience of God. What follows? 
This is, after all, exactly what we should expect if theism is true. As George 
Mavrodes has observed, 'There is no experience of [God] that occurs apart from 
His initiative and purpose; ... every experience of God is a revelation. 5 Yet it 
might be supposed that a lack of such knowledge calls into question the possibility 
of distinguishing veridical from non-veridical experiences of God. Thus Rowe: 
Most existing objects are such that there are conditions which, if satisfied 
by the subjects, the experience [of the objects] will follow. This is an 
important point we often rely on in judging whether a particular percep-
tual experience is veridical or delusory . . . . If we know that several 
subjects satisfy the conditions but do not have the experience, this will 
be grounds for taking a particular subject's putative experience ... as 
being delusive rather than veridical. God, however, is not such an 
object. God may choose to reveal himself to A but not reveal himself 
to B under similar conditions. This means that the failure of a number 
of subjects to have an experience of God under conditions similar to 
those in which A had an experience need not count against A's experience 
being veridical. (90, emphasis added) 
Here is an obvious difference between experience of "most existing objects" and 
experience of God. It is an epistemically significant difference-there is one 
means of checking sensory experiences that is not (or at least not obviously) 
available for checking experiences of God. Whether this epistemically significant 
difference makes a difference, or the difference Rowe takes it to make, is another 
matter. 
The objects of sensory experience (which I assume are material objects) are 
public and predictable. They are accessible to more than one sensory modality 
and to various perceivers at various times. They endure through time and do not 
pop out of existence or change their properties without being caused to do so. 
They have no prerogatives; whether and when they are experienced is in not 
way up to them. (Many living things--e.g. animals-have some such preroga-
tives, as anyone who has tried to photograph them knows.) It is the publicity 
and predictability of their objects that makes it possible for us to distinguish 
veridical from non-veridical sensory experiences. As for experience of God (the 
argument goes), its object is neither public nor predictable in the relevant sense; 
hence (it concludes) it is impossible to distinguish veridical from non-veridical 
experiences of God. This may be Rowe's reasoning in inferring (h) from (f) and 
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(g); the argument is not new. 6 But the inference is legitimate only if it can be 
shown that there are no other means by which veridical experiences of God are 
distinguishable from theirnon-veridical counterparts. Are there other such means? 
As reasonably competent perceivers we are all familiar with conditions which 
make for non-veridical sensory experiences. We learn of others by experience-
learning from our perceptual errors and those of others. Some of these conditions 
concern the state of our minds and/or bodies at the time of our experience. Earlier 
I suggested that in arguing for (f) Rowe claims that "the problem [presumably 
with denying (f)] is that we do not know what bodily and mental conditions are 
likely to lead to delusory experiences of God." I suspect we are not totally in 
the dark even here, but suppose we grant this claim for the moment. What 
follows? If Rowe's claim is true, then probably we lack this knowledge simply 
because we do not know what bodily and mental conditions are likely to lead 
to any experience of God, veridical or not. This (as Rowe notes) is no reason 
to suppose that veridical experiences of God do not or cannot occur; nor does 
it make it impossible to distinguish veridical from non-veridical experiences of 
God. 
What exactly does (f) demand? Means or criteria by which to identify non-ver-
idical experiences of God, criteria which if satisfied give some "positive reason" 
for thinking that some particular experience of God to which they apply is 
probably non-veridical. I suppose we have criteria which perform this function 
in cases of sensory experiences; and we may even appeal to them at times to 
sort out veridical perceptions from hallucinations, illusions and other forms of 
misperception. What these criteria are is not, I think, entirely clear. And if what 
is demanded is a set of such criteria which will suffice with respect to each 
particular sensory experience to place it clearly and finally into one or another 
perceptual or epistemic category, or that we be able to do this with most of our 
sensory experiences at a given time, I suspect very strongly that none of us can 
satisfy that demand. Yet we all get along well enough without such a set. Should 
we suppose that sensory experience, or the practice of taking sensory experiences 
to provide good evidence for claims about "the objects of the senses," or our 
ability to distinguish in many cases between a veridical sensory experience and 
an illusion or hallucination, is called into epistemic question if such an (in 
principle) universally applicable set of such criteria is not available? Or if we 
cannot specify such a set? Clearly not. But then why should we so suppose when 
dealing with experience of God? Rowe's suggestion seems to be that we have 
no idea how to identify non-veridical experiences of God, but that we have some 
idea how to identify non-veridical sensory experiences. Is that true? 
Well, how do we identify non-veridical sensory experiences? In most cases, 
I think, we do so by appealing to other sensory experiences, the assumed verid-
icality of which, together with other things we know about the object(s) of those 
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experienced and/or the conditions under which the experiences occur, entails or 
renders likely the non-veridicality of the particular sensory experience(s) in 
question. These other sensory experiences can be my own or those of other 
perceivers. For instance, if two experiences occur where the veridicality of one 
(perhaps in conjunction with other pieces of knowledge) entails the non-veridi-
cality of the other, then at least one of the experiences must be non-veridical. 
Which experience should be rejected as non-veridical and which taken to be 
veridical depends on a number of complex considerations which I cannot go into 
here. But there are two important points to note. First, identifying and dismissing 
a particular sensory experience as non-veridical often (if not always) involves 
assuming that another sensory experience is veridical. Why? Because without 
such an assumption-which need not be groundless or arbitrary-it is hard to 
see how we might recognize what it is about the first experience that makes it 
non-veridical. For example, it seems on the basis of one experience that there 
is a crouching brown bear on the distant hillside, but as another experience (from 
a different angle or closer up) makes clear, it is just an oddly-shaped stump. Or 
maybe it seems in one experience that the cup on the desk is orange, but another 
(in different light) tells me it is really red. Or again, in one experience I might 
seem to be aware of a bottle on the table, but another allows me to see that "the 
bottle on the table" is really a hologram, that I was not, as I seemed to be, 
seeing a bottle on the table. In each of these cases some sensory experience or 
other is taken to be veridical, and it is on this basis that they can be dismissed 
as non-veridical. This sort of assumption underlies many of the criteria by means 
of which we distinguish between veridical and non-veridical sensory experiences. 
I see no reason to think that every means at our disposal requires this assumption; 
but that we often do make it seems clear enough. 
The second thing to notice is this. It is logically possible that all our sensory 
experience be non-veridical, and that we be unable to discover this unfortunate 
fact. None of us is "compelled by logic" to assume that some sensory experiences 
or other are veridical. Of course the number of successful predictions and interac-
tions with our surroundings provides what some would take to be strong evidence 
for thinking that what is logically possible is not true; but these successes clearly 
do not entail that any particular sensory experience is veridical. 
I belabor these points for a simple reason. As Rowe indicates, we do have 
some idea how to identify non-veridical sensory experiences. Doing this often 
involves assuming that some sensory experience or other is veridical, and arguing 
that the veridicality of that experience shows that another experience is not 
veridical. There is no proof independent of appeal to (sensory) experience that 
this assumption is true. The relevance of these points to the argument from 
religious experience is this. 
Suppose that by assuming that some experience of God or other is veridical 
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we can identify and dismiss other experiences of God as non-veridical. This 
assumption, like its counterpart for sensory experience, need not be groundless 
or arbitrary. Of course none of us is any more "compelled by logic" to make 
this assumption than to make the other. It is logically possible that no veridical 
experiences of God occur and that we be unable to discover this unfortunate 
fact. This is possible even if God exists. and even if we know that He exists. 
I am suggesting it is open to the theist to claim that the kind of reasoning we 
typically engage in in checking particular sensory experiences can perform a 
similar function in cases of experience of God. We can assume, if only provision-
ally, "for the sake of the argument," that some experience of God or other is 
probably veridical; on this basis other experiences of God can be identified and 
dismissed as non-veridical. 
It is not hard to anticipate objections to this suggestion. One, which I shall 
dismiss summarily, is this. It is unreasonable to assume, even provisionally, that 
any particular experience of God is probably veridical unless we have (indepen-
dent) reasons to think that the experiential kind of which it is an instance is 
generally reliable. But we do not have such reasons; hence it is unreasonable to 
assume that any particular experience of God is probably veridical. But of course 
we do not have similarly independent reasons for thinking that the experiential 
kind of which particular sensory experiences are instances is generally reliable; 
our conviction that it is reliable is-and, surely, can only be-got by working 
"upward" from particular sensory experiences, weeding out those we have "posi-
tive reason" to think are non-veridical. This is, I take it, the point of the Principle 
of Credulity. To offer this objection is, in effect, to reject the Principle of 
Credulity altogether, to treat experiences of God as epistemically "guilty until 
proved innocent." Short of the sort of proofs Rowe has concede we do not have, 
it is hard to see what might justify this treatment. 
Another possible objection is this: to have "positive reasons" for thinking my 
experience of seeing the cup on my desk is non-veridical I do not have to appeal 
to other experiences of the cup, much less other experiences of seeing the cup. 
I can appeal to experiences of other objects, or to experiences of the cup via 
other sensory modalities, or to the experiences of other suitably placed perceivers. 
On the other hand, to have "positive reasons" of this sort for dismissing an 
experience of God as non-veridical I must rely on other experiences of God. 
Does this not make a difference? 
Yes, it does. But this difference is hardly surprising. After all, there are lots 
of objects of visual experience to experience of which we might appeal to check 
the reliability of our sight. There is only one God. So it seems quite unfair to 
demand that we appeal to experiences of other things to check particular experi-
ences of God. 
Further, experiences are grouped as visual (or as aural, or as haptic) according 
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to their modality. This fact, together with the fact that many objects of these 
kinds of experiences are accessible to more than one sensory modality, makes 
it possible for us to use "cross-modal" checking procedures on these experiences. 
There may be different modalities by which God is experienced (1 do not know); 
but I have written as if experiences were to be grouped as being of God on the 
basis of their (apparent) object, not according to their modality (as we might 
group "cup-experiences" on the basis of their apparent object, irrespective of 
their modality). This being so, there seems to me to be no reason whatever for 
expecting that appeal to "cross-modal" checking procedures of the sort that are 
available for sensory experiences has a place in checking experiences of God. 
It does not follow from this, of course, that they cannot be checked. 
On a more positive note, the suggestion that we proceed in cases of experiences 
of God as we do in cases of sensory experience has its roots in some of the 
theistic mystical tradition. Some mystics, for example, seem interested in finding 
ways to distinguish "genuine" (veridical) from "counterfeit" religious experi-
ences. The writings of St. Teresa of Avila evidence a concern on Teresa's part 
to find marks or criteria which would enable her to know of a given "locution" 
whether it was from God or from the devil. And while Teresa's locutions are 
not experiences of God (and are not necessarily products of such experiences), 
the sorts of criteria she suggests are still relevant to our concerns. 
William Wainwright" has briefly discussed criteria like Teresa's, including 
(1) The consequences of the experience must be good for the mystic. 
The experience must lead to, produce or reinforce a new life marked 
by such virtues as wisdom, charity and humility. 
(2) One must consider the effect which the experience has on others. 
(3) The depth, profundity, and the "sweetness" (Jonathan Edwards) or 
what the mystic says on the basis of his experience count in favor of 
the genuineness [i.e. veridicality] of his experience. 
(4) We must examine what the mystic says on the basis of his experience 
and see whether it agrees or disagrees with orthodox talk. 
(5) It will be helpful to determine whether the experience resembles [in 
religiously significant ways] other mystical experiences regarded as 
paradigmatic by the religious community. 
(6) We must also consider the pronouncements of authority. (pp. 86-87) 
Wainwright suggests further that 
these criteria are similar to the tests which we employ in ordinary 
perceptual cases to determine whether an apparent perception of an 
object is a genuine [i.e. veridical] perception of it; that is, they are 
similar to the tests which take things into account like the position of 
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the observer and the condition of his sensory equipment (88), 
and that 
such criteria have been used [in the Christian (particularly the Catholic) 
community] to distinguish the experiences which genuinely involve a 
perception of God from those which do not.(86) 
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Adequate discussion of the role and status of Wainwright's six criteria is a 
large task, but I think the following general remark is in order. 8 Each of Wain-
wright's (1)-(6) can be employed as he suggests they have been employed only 
if we are willing to endorse these two claims: 
and 
(i) Orthodox theology and ethics are true, 
U) Genuine or veridical experience of God will conflict with neither 
orthodox theology nor ethics. 
And accepting (i) and U) is tantamount to granting the veridicality of some 
experiences of God (those enshrined in orthodox writings and/or tradition). Other 
experiences of God can be identified and dismissed as non-veridical because 
they conflict with either the doctrines assumed to be true or the experiences 
assumed to be veridical. 
Criteria like Wainwright's (1)-(6), then, will be of some use within a religious 
tradition (as he claims), but they are of much less use on an intertraditional 
basis. Wainwright suggests in several places (pp. 83, 85, 86) that (1)-(6) are 
"independent," though he does not make it clear of what they are allegedly 
independent. They are, I suppose, or at any rate can be, independent of particular 
experiences of God whose veridicality is in question. But if this is to be understood 
more strongly, as "independent of commitment to the truth of religious, theolog-
ical or moral claims central to the traditions in which the experiences being 
evaluated occur," Wainwright's suggestion is pretty clearly false. What one 
tradition regards as "good consequences for the mystic," or as "depth, profundity 
and 'sweetness' ," or as "the pronouncements of authority" may be quite different 
from what another tradition regards as such. As Ninian Smart9 put it, 
"By their fruits ye shall know them," or more particularly, "By my 
fruits shall I know Him." But it should be noted that [these] judgements 
are very complex. For fruits are clearly evaluated by reference to certain 
ideals and values (such as serenity and zeal) which derive their centrality 
from the shape of the religious tradition in question. The Buddhist may 
evaluate fruits rather differently from a Christian, a Muslim from a 
Hindu. This does not make the appeal [to fruits] quite circular, for two 
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reasons: first, a religion needs to show that it at least has the power to 
produce the fruits that it values; and second, the fruits tie in with moral 
insights which men may have independently of commitment to a par-
ticular tradition. 
And there may be, in addition to the "moral insights which men may have 
independently of commitment to a particular tradition," other ways to evaluate 
and assess the religious, theological and moral claims which underlie applications 
of Wainwright's criteria. So it may still be possible to develop criteria which-
unlike Wainwright's---can be applied on an intertraditional basis. But there is 
no guarantee they will much resemble (1)-(6). 
Even such intertraditionally-applicable criteria may, like their sensory-experi-
ence counterparts, require that we assume, if only provisionally, "for the sake 
of the argument," that some experience or other is veridical. Again it needs to 
be stressed that such an assumption need not be groundless or arbitrary. Which 
particular experience(s) of God should be assumed to be veridical, for example, 
is open to argument. In this experience of God is no different from sensory 
experience. 
As with sensory experience, the assumption that a particular experience of 
God is veridical is neither inscrutable nor unoverturnable. We may, despite our 
best efforts, come to have reasons for believing ourselves mistaken in dismissing 
El because it conflicted with E2. That we can make mistakes like this does not 
mean that we cannot go about identifying particular experiences of God as 
non-veridical by comparing them to other such experiences. We cannot expect 
a proof of the veridicality of any experience (whether of God or of tables and 
chairs) unless we are willing to treat such experiences as epistemically "innocent 
until proved guilty." A presumption of epistemic guilt, or the assumption that 
experiences (whether of God or of material objects) should be assumed to be 
non-veridical until proven otherwise, or that particular instances of a given 
experiential kind cannot reasonably be assumed to be veridical without proof 
that the kind of which they are instances is generally reliable, leads only to 
skepticism. Skepticism of this sort with respect to sensory experience is thought 
by many to be unreasonable. The argument with which this essay began purports 
to show that such (as it were wholesale) skepticism with respect to experience 
of God is also unreasonable. If it follows from the arguments I have given that 
the success of the argument from religious experience depends in part on the 
availability of non-experiential reasons for particular religious beliefs, this seems 
to me not the least bit surprising. Experience is often helpful in, but by itself 
hardly ever decisive for, assessing scientific theories. So too, it seems, with 
experiences of God and theologies. 
Much more can be, and needs to be, said on these matters. 10 Even so, it seems 
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to me that Rowe's claim that "we don't know how to discover positive reasons 
for thinking that religious experiences are delusive, if such reasons do exist," is 
false, and that his argument against using the Principle of Credulity when con-
sidering experiences of God should be rejected. In the end it strikes me that 
Rowe has simply assumed that reasons drawn from experiences of God cannot 
themselves be "reasons for thinking that particular experiences of God are delu-
sive," that experiences of God cannot themselves provide a (fallible and provi-
sional) means for the critique of other such experiences. I see no reason to think 
that this assumption is true, and good reason to think that, when suitably amended 
and applied to sensory experience, it is false. Nor do I see the slightest reason 
why we cannot use knowledge or beliefs about God not gleaned from experience 
of God to identify and dismiss particular experiences of God as non-veridical. 
We proceed in something like this way when sensory experiences are at issue; 
it is Swinburne's suggestion that we proceed in similar ways with experience of 
God. There are epistemically interesting differences between sensory experience 
and experience of God, but they do not lie in the presence or absence, or even 
in the character, of criteria for identifying and dismissing instances of each as 
non-veridical. 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
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